EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE
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INTRODUCTION
Ivan Illich’s cut-to-the bone linkages between gender and in
dustrial capitalism in Gender 1 leave me nearly speechless. Never
theless, like Salieri stuttering about Mozart’s genius, I cannot help
but offer a few thoughts about his grand screed against economic
thinking, accusing it of undermining gender, social organization,
and our very humanity. His ideas, which incensed some feminists in
the 1980s,2 have retained their shock value, and even freshness, de
spite the many changes in law and culture over the past three de
cades. By combining far-left and far-right thinking to up-end cozy
assumptions like equality-is-good-for-women, Illich all but guaran
teed feminist ire. But Gender deserves, indeed demands, a second
and third look, despite, or even because of, its stubborn resistance
to easy categorization. If we can read Illich in a way that is consis
tent with our deepest convictions about equality, dignity, auton
omy, and the way that men and women interact in the day-to-day
world, his work could inform legal doctrinal changes. His novel
concepts, like “shadow work,”3 “counterproductivity,”4 and “ver
nacular gender,”5 in particular, may well suggest new solutions to
old, stubborn problems like the systemic devaluation of the home
making labor in family law and other areas. We certainly need a
way to show lawyers, judges, legislators, and policymakers the value
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1. IVAN ILLICH, GENDER (1982).
2. Symposium, Beyond the Backlash: A Feminist Critique of Ivan Illich’s Theory
of Gender, 3 FEMINIST ISSUES 2 (1983).
3. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 45-46.
4. Id. at 15-17.
5. Id. at 67-89.
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of day-to-day cooking, cleaning, and help with homework that sus
tains millions of families, and thus, children and society more
generally.6
Illich’s approach is magisterial and absolutely unapologetic.
But bluster alone is not enough. The job of grand theories like law
and economics and postmodernism is to both explain the world as it
is and predict how it can and should look in the future. We test a
theory’s explanatory and predictive power by applying it, checking
for any weak points by poking, prodding, and even slamming it
against the wall, like the ape in the 1970 American Tourister lug
gage commercials who demonstrated a suitcase’s strength by stomp
ing on it.7 If an idea can survive that kind of beating, it can carry
solutions to the problems that law must address. Consider this Ar
ticle such a test.
I start within Illich’s worldview. Like Gender, this Article
adopts a profoundly essentialist, sweeping approach, drawing on a
range of literatures and periods of history. He presents an image of
men, women, and society, inviting, or even commanding, that we
look to see if it reflects what we see in families. But looking into
Illich’s depiction produces, for me, a mirror image, the very oppo
site of his. Where he condemns exchange for undermining gender,
burdening women with shadow work, and robbing both men and
women of coherent social organization and their very humanity, my
own research about love and contracts reveals that exchange cre
ated the world of gender. Reciprocal exchanges, from the very
dawn of humanity, have served to facilitate, not undermine, gender,
family, and social organization. They enabled our very evolution
from hairy bipeds to modern humans uniquely able, among all spe
cies, to write, read, and argue about books like Gender, not to men
tion invent the internet and root for a favorite contestant in
Dancing with the Stars.8
My dance with this intellectual star draws heavily on a book
project of my own, titled Love & Contracts.9 Like Illich, I put ex
change at the center of my analysis and also seek to protect what is
6. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1996). See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:
WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000).
7. 1971 American Tourist “Gorilla” Commercial, YOUTUBE (May 19, 2010), http:/
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=8C-e96m4730.
8. Dancing With the Stars (An ABC television broadcast).
9. MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE & CONTRACTS: THE HEART OF THE DEAL
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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most dear to us, from relationships to social organization outside
families. Like Illich, I worry about the disproportionate cost borne
by women who perform mountains of shadow work. But while he
sees exchange in domestic relationships as unique to the industrial
West, and inherently dehumanizing and subordinating, I argue for
exchange as a foundational building block for forming families, and,
indeed, a central factor in our evolution through pre-history, al
lowing us to survive and even thrive through millennia scraping by
in subsistence living before the advent of central heating and gro
cery stores (not to mention plumbing, roads, and Penicillin). To
day, exchanges still help us every day to create, sustain, mend, and
even, when necessary, end family relationships.
My book Love & Contracts,10 like Illich’s work, invites readers
to think about old, familiar ideas and relationships in new ways.
Primarily, I hope to convince readers that families—seemingly sites
of the most selfless, unconditional love—are also, at their very
foundation, grounded in mutual exchanges. If you are like most
people, this view runs aground on your strongest intuitions, which
treat family love as unconditional. Love & Contracts includes
memoir chapters about having a baby with a gay friend, and then,
when the child is still in diapers, meeting the woman I will marry,
who becomes a third parent in our extraordinary family. The book
is, in large part, my thank you note for this grand gift. I cannot
define love, of course, but, but I do try to show love’s power. Like
any gift exchange, getting love inspires reciprocation, just as the
gifts of a strong body and a good mind call you to “give back” by
putting your particular talents to good use. Family love, I argue,
calls for back and forth exchanges, day-in and day-out.
Like Illich, I up-end common assumptions. And like him, I
have come up with some new terms to help readers understand my
new take on old standard views of family. Old, familiar language
tends, unfortunately, to lead us to think in old, familiar ways, nar
rowing our thoughts. I offer a new vantage point on families by
using two distinctions that reveal the symbiotic relationship be
tween love and contracts: (1) “contracts” and “deals”; and (2) “or
dinary” and “extraordinary” families.
The first distinction I offer is between “contracts” and “deals.”
“Contract” is a legal term of art to describe the kind of agreement
courts enforce.11 You “contract” to buy a car or rent a vacation
10.
11.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
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apartment, which means that if you do not pay, the dealership or
condominium owner can sue you. But courts will not enforce some
agreements, like illegal drug deals, or a husband’s promise to pay
his wife $50,000 if he cheats on her again.12 I call these non-binding
agreements “deals,” and argue that they shape our lives even
though they are not legally binding. What matters is that deals, like
contracts, are voluntary and reciprocal exchanges. Both contracts
and deals create and sustain families: contracts for renting an apart
ment, mortgages, joint credit cards, and beneficiary designations on
retirement accounts, just for starters, and deals like agreeing that
one will be a full-time mom or dad while the other engages in wage
labor to support the family.13 Those exchanges, day-in and day-out,
provide a way to act out being an “us” with your boyfriend, girl
friend, husband, wife, and kids—not to mention your parents,
brothers, sisters, and anyone else you consider “family.” Not titfor-tat, exactly, nor a pure, unreciprocated gift, but something in
between the two that contains both self-interest and generosity.14
By looking at both non-binding contracts and more informal deals,
I hope to pull back the curtain wrapped around families that makes
their give and take look like pure gifts instead of mutual exchanges,
explain why exchanges build relationships, and, finally, show how
recognizing the key role of exchanges in our love lives can improve
family law as well as family life.
I also distinguish between “ordinary” and “extraordinary”
families. Seeing the exchanges underlying all kinds of families
makes it easier to see the many differences among families as mor
ally neutral variations. What matters most is connection through
exchange, not the particular form the connection. Therefore, I talk
12.
2002).
13.

Id. §§ 17, 71, 178; Diosdado v. Diosdado, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Cal. App.

See PAULA SZUCHMAN & JENNY ANDERSON, SPOUSONOMICS: USING ECO
MASTER LOVE, MARRIAGE, AND DIRTY DISHES 24 (2011); Lois Smith
Brady, State of the Unions: No Tethering, and It’s All Good, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010,
at Style 17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/fashion/weddings/26unions.
html (quoting singer Judy Collins’ description of her marriage to Louis Nelson: “I cook,
he washes up . . . . Sometimes it’s just as basic as that . . .”).
14. Economic sociologist Viviana Zelizer expertly charts the vast territory lying
between the extremes of self-interested transactions and altruistic intimate relation
ships, giving examples like engagement rings and support agreements, demonstrating
the complex ways that economic exchanges and intimacy interact. See generally VI
VIANA A. ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY (2011);
VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD (1985); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF
MONEY (1994).
NOMICS TO
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about “ordinary” and “extraordinary” families instead of “tradi
tional” and “unconventional” families to displace assumptions that
form matters more than the function of families to connect. Ordi
nary families are the most common: married, straight, raising kids
they conceived at home. Family law sets its default rules based on
the assumption that most people fall into these categories. But
sometimes luck, law, or biology pushes people toward Plan B, lead
ing them to live together instead of marrying, form same-sex un
ions, and/or have kids through reproductive technologies or
adoption. These Plan B families are best described as “extraordi
nary” because they’re literally out of the ordinary. A type of family
can change from being “extraordinary” to “ordinary,” as when, in
1967, the Supreme Court designated interracial couples as legally
ordinary after Mildred and Richard Loving successfully challenged
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law.15 Today, same sex couples who
can marry in states like Massachusetts and Iowa are making samesex couples more legally ordinary, though, as of this writing, we re
main extraordinary under federal law.16
I hope, by calling families “ordinary” or “extraordinary,” to
help family law, and society more generally, to finally shake off out
dated views that some families are natural while others are unnatu
ral. What’s natural, I have come to believe, is the human desire to
connect. Exchanges, big and small, sustain that connection, day in
and day out, in all kinds of families. Connection is such a primal
need that people go to great lengths to cobble together a Plan B
way to connect when Plan A doesn’t work out.
We will always have some extraordinary families, because all
crucial functions have back-ups. The ordinary way down from the
25th floor is an elevator, but stairs serve the same function when
the power goes out. Parents ordinarily put their kids to bed, but
babysitters pitch in when parents go out or work late. Family law
should recognize different kinds of families—ordinary and ex
traordinary—to honor the importance of connection in the lives of
the men, women, and children in those families, and also in society
more generally.
15. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. Goodridge v. Dept. Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738(C) (2010). The federal government has ceased defending DOMA, but still en
forces it. Marc Ambinder, Obama Won’t Go to Court Over Defense of Marriage Act,
NAT’L JOURNAL, Feb. 23, 2011.

410

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:405

My terminology, recognizing the deep structural similarity be
tween contracts and deals, and comparing “ordinary” and “ex
traordinary” families, helps reveal the many exchanges that shape
families, and also the way that those exchanges, by definition, vary,
producing different kinds of families. All of these families exist to
address our fundamental human need to connect. Illich might well
have approved of this focus on connection and cooperation as first
principles, given his eloquent support for conviviality.17
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, it describes Illich’s
allergy to exchange as the agent that replaced households defined
by vernacular gender with married pairs in “inhumane”18 sex-neu
tral economic partnerships. Second, it challenges Illich’s view of
exchange as a destroyer that has meddled in families for only a few
hundred years.19 I use sociobiological literature to counter his case
against exchange with one valorizing two exchanges that I call “pri
mal deals” that played crucial roles in the evolution of humans,
families, and day-to-day life. Third, it contends that primal deals—
especially the primal pair-bonding deal between men and women—
continue to play a central role in families and family law today. Fi
nally, this Article concludes by proposing a change in family law to
reflect the contractual nature of families by allowing spouses to
contract out of the primal deal, but at the same time recognize that
those prenuptial agreements effectively cancel the primal deal be
tween spouses. Accordingly, courts enforcing prenuptial agree
ments should also compensate the spouses who gave up property
sharing rights in the prenuptial agreements for the hours, months,
and years spent making and sustaining the home and family.
I. ILLICH’S ALLERGY TO EXCHANGE
Illich’s critique of exchange in domestic arrangements is closely
linked to his larger critique of industrial capitalism, and indeed, ec
onomic growth. Only negative economic growth policies, he warns,
can “reduce sexism” and create “peace between men and wo
men.”20 Contrary to conventional wisdom, he argues that protect
ing “equal rights,” and seeing marriage as a partnership, may give
“a sense of accomplishment to the elites who proposed and ob
tained them, but [leave] the majority of women untouched, if not
17. See generally IVAN ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY (Harper & Row 1973).
18. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 76.
19. Id. at 4, 11-13.
20. Id. at 15-16.

2012]

EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES

411

worse off than before.”21 Illich makes numerous and complex argu
ments to prove these grand assertions. Nevertheless, without too
much over-simplification, we can distill his main argument into
three main points: (1) gender is uniquely human and beneficial; (2)
exchange destroys gender; and, consequently, (3) exchange dehu
manizes us by replacing vibrant gendered households with sex-neu
tral economic partnerships.22 Each of these points merits brief
elaboration.
A. Gender is Uniquely Human and Beneficial
Illich defines sex and gender idiosyncratically. While many
feminists see gender as the social or cultural aspect of biological
sex,23 Illich presents gender as more innate, and sex, which he dubs
“economic sex,” as socially constructed.24 “[O]ne is born and bred
into gender,” he tells us, while “the sex role is something ac
quired.”25 Gender, which he calls “vernacular gender,” is, in his
view, “substantive,” like being either a square or a circle.26 He de
fines “sex” as “the sex of economic neuters,” and sees it as a “mod
ern experiment to deny or transcend” gender.27 Gender, in this
view, is intimately bound up with our humanity, and therefore, in
family structure and function.28
“Kinship,” he explains, “is possible only between what we con
ceive as men and women; it only specifies the fit between gendered
people . . . . They fit like the right fits the left.”29 This fit, like right
and left hands, does not, Illich clarifies, mean that the left hand is in
any way inferior, as people used say as they forced left-handed chil
dren to become right-handed.30 The complementarity of left and
right, for Illich, protected women, as well as men, for most of
21. Id. at 16-17.
22. Id. at 74, 76, 168 n.120.
23. See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley, trans.
Vintage Books 1974). Other feminists see only culture, with sex being one social con
struction, and gender another. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER
(1993); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990).
24. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 14 n.7.
25. Id. at 81. Though initially it seems that Illich has simply reversed the conven
tional view of gender as cultural and sex as biological, he explicitly resists this simple
mapping, contending that “[b]oth gender and sex are social realities with only a tenuous
connection to anatomy.” Id. at 14 n.7.
26. Id. at 80-81.
27. Id. at 74, 80-81.
28. See id. at 67-68, 81.
29. Id. at 70.
30. Id. at 71.
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human history, all those many millennia while our ancestors lived in
subsistence, pre-industrial communities. In a subsistence society,
unlike prior to our own “push-button society,” he contends, “[e]ach
man and woman . . . depends for survival on the interplay of two
hands.”31 Men and women performed different tasks, and still do
in some places, he explains, citing wide-ranging ethnographies and
other literature on pre-capitalist communities.32 “In one valley of
the Alps,” he tells us, men and women meet on the threshing floor,
“he with the flail and she with the sieve,”33 while in a Dijon village
women choose which pig will be slaughtered, and address it as
“Monsieur,” but the men “set the day for the slaughter.”34 Men do
men’s work, in short, and women do women’s work, though pre
cisely which tasks get assigned to men or women varies greatly
across communities.35 What seems to matter most to Illich is the
community-centered coordination of male and female labor.36 He
sees it as undergirding the dominant domestic institution, the
household, which in turn mediated relationships “between the indi
vidual and the village community, not the twosome, the parents, the
couple.”37 These patterns survived for millennia, he contends, giv
ing way only in the wake of economic thinking.38
B. Economic Exchange Destroys Gender
According to Illich, that economic, exchange-oriented view of
interactions with people, the land, and communities destroyed gen
der, and at the same time, deprived us of an essential element of
our humanity.39 By inventing the idea of scarcity, he contends, eco
nomic thinking encouraged economic exchange to manage pur
ported scarcity, dethroning gender as an organizing principle for
daily life, social organization, and our very humanity.40 In Illich’s
view, this change demoted us from fully human, gendered men and
women to vastly inferior genderless individuals: “for me, what is
unique about Homo sapiens as a human phenomenon is the con
stant incarnation of the symbolic duality of gender . . . .
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 72.
Id. 106-09 (providing literature on different cultures).
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 108, 110, 113-14.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 111.
See id. at 76 n.57.
Id.
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[G]enderless modern humans behave almost as apes.”41 The culprit
for our degeneration from humane gender to “inhumane” sex, ac
cording to Illich, is “commodity-intensive industrial society”42 fu
eled by individualism. Illich views individualism—the view of us as
gender-neutral humans—as the lynchpin of a worldview centered
on exchange.43 It created industrialization, which, he contends,
supplanted good values like “decency,” “protect[ing] the weakest
from ruin,” and respect between men and women.44 In their stead,
industrialization gave us only the isolated rights of individuals, and
permitted men and women to do the same work.45 Doing the same
work as individuals, he reasons, has turned out to be a lousy deal
for women. It has led men in industrial economies to engage more
intensely in wage labor, and leaves women to perform an immense
amount of what Illich calls “shadow work,” like servicing the car
(and paying insurance on it) so she can drive to grocery stores,
where she will buy food that she will prepare and clean up at
home.46 This “shadow work,” according to Illich, “constitutes an
economic activity on which the cash flow, salaries, and surplus value
for capital formation all ultimately depend.”47 Rather than produce
significant value, shadow work consumes time and energy, endlessly
depletes women and their spirits.48 In sum, Illich up-ends conven
tional assertions that individualism and gender-neutrality is better
for women than pre-industrial gender duality, arguing that eco
nomic individualism paradoxically produces the opposite result: a
new class of human being, de-gendered women, treated, for the first
time, as a second sex.
His genealogy of this demise runs back to the sixteenth cen
tury.49 Illich, a Catholic priest, lays the blame squarely on the
shoulders of the Protestant Reformation, naming Martin Luther as
“the true inventor of the modern doctrine that there is something
inherently dignified and praise-worthy about labor, that the man
who bears the burden in the heat of the day is somehow more
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 76, 94.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 111, 116.
Id. at 50.
See id. at 45 n.30.
Id. at 55.
See id. at 57.
Id. at 23.
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pleasing to God than the man who takes his ease in the shade.”50
That misconception, according to Illich, laid the groundwork for
what Illich describes as “the slow establishment of wage labor as
the prototype of work that should be dignified, gratifying, meaning
ful, and accessible to all.”51 In typical contrarian style, he turns this
view of independence bought with market labor on its head by
describing living off wages as “not . . . simple poverty but . . .
misery.”52
C. Exchange Replaced Vibrant Gendered Households with SexNeutral Economic Partnerships
Illich’s remedy, it seems, is to reinstate, or at least valorize, re
gendering women’s and men’s work to remedy women’s current
second-class citizenship. Only if households of men and women re
turn to living as two complementary genders, performing gendered
tasks for their community, can we escape today’s marriages made
up of men and women acting “almost as apes”53 as they mechani
cally enact a “genderless economic partnership between a wage la
borer and a shadow worker.”54 We will achieve true equality
between men and women, he argues, only when we abandon the
fiction of gender-neutrality that underlies an individualist-centered,
economic-growth oriented society.55 This change, far from being
backward, in his view, would correct a brief and misguided detour
away from gender, and reassert gender to correct the “profound
discontinuity” he sees “between all past forms of existence and
Western individualism.”56 Only valuing work that is gendered, it
seems, can correct the degradation of women that Illich attributes
to gender’s demise.57
There is a lot to like about what Illich says. First, his concept
of “shadow work” gives name to the avalanche of petty tasks that
we perform to keep twenty-first century households running—pay
ing bills, registering cars, making doctor’s appointments, let alone
navigating phone trees to make those appointments—that, to
50.

Id. at 23 n.13 (quoting H.L. MENCKEN, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE: AN IN
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH IN THE UNITED STATES (1980)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 76.
54. Id. at 168 n.120.
55. Id. at 10 n.5.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 126 (“[T]he loss of gender does and must degrade women even more
than men.”).
QUIRY INTO THE
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gether, threaten to overwhelm even the most patient of us.58 Sec
ond, I agree with him that Protestant ideas played a key role in
investing individuals with the power to shape their lives, which
ushered in our current idealized view of marriage as a partnership
among purported equals.59 Third, he is properly names the persis
tence of gender inequality despite decades of legal and cultural at
tempts to treat men and women as if they were gender-neutral
citizens.
But he and I differ in diagnosing the cause of the disconnect
between our contemporary rhetoric of formal equality and the lived
experience of men and women that results in too many women
working an uncompensated second shift on household labor, and
too narrow a view of what constitutes a family. Where Illich
charges exchange with the crime of dethroning gender, and usher
ing in an inhumane sex-neutral regime that, nevertheless, values
men and masculinity more than women and femininity,60 I see ex
change as the very foundation of our humanity, gender, our fami
lies, and the various arrangements that people have long made in
different ways in different times and places to keep body and soul
together.
II. GENDER, HOUSEHOLDS, AND FAMILIES BROUGHT
US BY EXCHANGE

TO

Without exchange there would be no gender and no families.
Indeed, according to some anthropological research, we would not
exist as human beings. Millions of years ago, before courts, law
yers, governments, or even language, our proto-human ancestors
entered two kinds of exchanges that changed everything. I call both
“primal deals” because these exchanges functioned as fundamental,
primeval engines of family and social organization.61
58. Craig Lambert, Opinion, Our Unpaid, Extra Shadow Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2011, at SR12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/opinion/sunday/our
unpaid-extra-shadow-work.html?pagewanted=all.
59. See generally JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MAR
RIAGE, RELIGION, AND THE LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (Don S. Browning & Ian
S. Evison, eds., 1997).
60. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 76.
61. 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 471 (2d ed. 1991) (defining primal as
“[b]elonging to the first age or earliest stage; original, . . . primitive, primeval . . . .
Relating or pertaining to such needs, fears, behaviour, etc., as form the origins of emo
tional life, esp. as in Freud’s theory”; as well as “Of first rank, standing, or importance;
chief, . . . fundamental, essential”).
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The first exchange, sometimes known as the “sex contract” in
anthropological literature,62 is a primal deal between men and wo
men to form a pair bond. According to sociobiologists63 like E.O.
Wilson, women exchanged sexual exclusivity and foraged food for
men’s bounty from the hunt and a bit of protection and help with
the children. The deal served the larger goal of getting their genes
to the next generation, which many sociobiologists see as the funda
mental goal of every action taken by humans, every other species,
and life itself.64
The second primal deal has more recently come to light in
work by evolutionary scholars like anthropologist Sarah Blaffer
Hrdy and psychologist Shelley Taylor. Hrdy and Taylor focus on
different questions—Hrdy as a primatologist, and Taylor as a social
psychologist—but both document, in ancient as well as contempo
rary cultures, exchanges among women—often mothers—to help
raise their children and care for other close intimates.65 These two
primal deals—pair bonding and tending—together enabled us to
evolve into a species apart. More importantly, those primal deals
continue to define key features of family life, and therefore, appro
priately serve as a backbone for family law. The reciprocal ex
change at the heart of the first deal, pair bonding between men and
women, may well explain why legal rules have long described mar
riage as a civil contract.66
62. See generally HELEN E. FISHER, THE SEX CONTRACT: THE EVOLUTION OF
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1982); SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHERS & OTHERS 147 (2009).
63. Illich, to be fair, would likely dismiss these sociobiological arguments as inher
ently sexist and racist. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 75-79. Nevertheless, sociobiology seems
hardly to have faded as the “academic fad” Illich charges it with being. Instead, it now
includes feminists like Sarah Blaffer Hrdy and Shelley Taylor, who demonstrate that
evolutionary biology and psychology can uncover complementities between genders of
the sort Illich valorizes.
64. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (3d ed. 2006); E.O.
WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE (rev. ed. 2004).
65. While men participate in what Taylor calls “tending” exchanges, they are
more often on the receiving end of care than the giving end.
66. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 433 (1884). Family law, of course,
has changed greatly since Blackstone. In the eighteenth century, the common law
treated women and children as essentially property of men, subject to the control and
discipline of the man of their household. Over the past 150 years, however, family law
rules have changed to treat women and children as more fully human, for example, by
recognizing wives’ rights to contract and own property, protecting women and children
from domestic violence, and also treating fathers of non-marital children as legal fa
thers. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating
Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994); Joseph Warren, Hus
band’s Right to Wife’s Services, 38 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1925). Accordingly, I make no
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A. Pair Bonding between Men and Women
Millions of years ago, anthropologist Helen Fisher tells us, our
apelike ancestor began “the most fundamental exchange the human
race would ever make.”67 Our hairy fore-mothers, she explains,
spent their days collecting edible roots and other vegetables, while
their male counterparts ranged over wider territory looking for a
rabbit or mongoose to eat.68 But while their ancestors had mated
freely, these proto-humans gradually formed pair bonds structured
by an exchange. A female would focus her sexual and grooming
attention on one male, and share her foraged vegetables with him,
while he, in turn, would share his proceeds from the hunt. Whether
these relationships lasted a few months, a year, or a lifetime, they
were reciprocal. She expected a share of meat brought back from
hunting, and he expected a share of “her” vegetables. Outsiders
got only surplus. Gradually, he also began to protect her from dan
gers like other animals.69 Little by little, over thousands of years,
men in his position extended their efforts beyond sharing food, and
also began to help feed and protect the young. Those actions, like
coaching little ones about what foods were safe to eat, and helping
out when they were sick or sad,70 transformed those children from
“hers” into “theirs.”
E.O. Wilson, often called the father of sociobiology,71 also sees
this reciprocal exchange as central to human families, allowing us to
evolve to our current state with large, complex brains that produce
language and cooperation unseen in other mammals.72 These malefemale pair bonds helped greatly in raising young who start out ab
solutely helpless and do not become self-sufficient for more than
ten years.73 With pair bonding, women could bear four times as
many children as they would otherwise, giving natural selection
four times as many people from whom to select the genes of the
claim that the ancient provenance of the primal deals I discuss has produced identical
legal rules over time and place. Such a claim would be patently false.
67. FISHER, supra note 62, at 94.
68. Id. at 99.
69. Id. at 100.
70. Id.
71. Herma Hill Kay, Perspectives on Sociobiology, Feminism, and the Law, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 76 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
1990).
72. FISHER, supra note 62, at 102; WILSON, supra note 64, 123, 139.
73. HRDY, supra note 62, at 101.
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smartest, fastest, strongest, and most cooperative to convey to fu
ture generations.74
Moreover, those smarts are costly. A human infant, then
child’s, brain requires phenomenally high caloric intake, which in
turn requires cooperation among people to collect enough food to
get a child to reproductive age, when he or she can start the cycle
again.75 As Wilson explains, that slow, expensive breeding gave our
ancestors who could strike deals with one another a leg up in get
ting their genes to the next generation:
Human beings, as typical large primates, breed slowly. Mothers
carry fetuses for nine months and afterward are encumbered by
infants and small children who require milk at frequent intervals
through the day. It is to the advantage of each woman of the
hunter-gatherer band to secure the allegiance of men who will
contribute meat and hides while sharing the labor of child-rear
ing. It is to the reciprocal advantage of each man to obtain exclu
sive sexual rights to women and to monopolize their economic
productivity. If the evidence from hunter-gatherer life has been
correctly interpreted, the exchange has resulted in near universal
ity of the pair bond and the prevalence of extended families with
men and their wives forming the nucleus.76

In this view, genes need a lot more than bare reproduction to get to
the next generation. Flirting, courting, and the elaborate social
rituals—from love songs to designating appropriate gifts for partic
ular wedding anniversaries77—facilitate and support the pair bond
exchange that increases the chance of each child maturing to repro
ductive age, and starting the cycle again.78
Two aspects of this story undermine Illich’s charge that ex
change dehumanizes men and women. First, it shows that male
contributions in the pair-bonding primal deal made it possible for
us to become gendered humans in the first place. While mothers in
74. FISHER, supra note 62, at 102.
75. HRDY, supra note 62, at 146 (“No creature in the world (unless, just possibly,
a bowhead whale) takes longer to mature than a human child does. Nor does any other
creature need so much for so long before his acquisition and production of resources
matches his consumption.”).
76. WILSON, supra note 64, at 139 (emphasis added).
77. Emily Post codified the appropriate anniversary gifts: paper for the first anni
versary, and so on, up to silver for the twenty-fifth wedding anniversary, and gold for
the fiftieth, or golden, wedding anniversary. EMILY POST, ETIQUETTE IN SOCIETY, IN
BUSINESS, IN POLITICS AND AT HOME 378 (1922).
78. WILSON, supra note 64, at 141; see also DAWKINS, supra note 64, for an ex
tended argument that all human activities, indeed all activities of all species, are aimed
to get their genes to the next generation.
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nearly all mammalian species care for young,79 the pair bond vastly
increases human fathers’ contributions toward their young, far
above other species. Most other high primate fathers are deadbeat
dads, absent at best. In some species, fathers get credit for resisting
the temptation to eat their young. The very singularity of human
male willingness to exchange the scarce resources of time, food, and
energy for sexual exclusivity and a share of gathered roots and veg
etables played a tremendous role in making us the big-brained,
talking, writing, cooperative species that engages in the type of
elaborate social rituals of gender division that Illich valorizes.
Second, the pair bonding exchange enables elaborate human
cultures to form. Our distant ancestors began to cooperate in pair
bonds over a million years ago. Bit by bit, over millennia, they de
veloped reciprocal exchange networks, first within families, then
between families, and, eventually, so different from other species,80
even among strangers. This last stage, exchange among strangers,
defines human society for Wilson:
Reciprocation among distantly related or unrelated individuals is
the key to human society. The perfection of the social contract
has broken the ancient vertebrate constraints imposed by rigid
kin selection. Through the convention of reciprocation, com
bined with a flexible, endlessly productive language and a genius
for verbal classification, human beings fashion long-remembered
agreements upon which cultures and civilizations can be built.81

In other words, the pair-bonding primal deal paved the way for eve
ryone’s family, and also the more general human evolution that al
lows me to write, and you to read, this Article, as well as much
grander efforts like creating democracies, eradicating polio, build
ing the Pantheon, and organizing flash mobs.
Helen Fisher, alongside sociobiologists like Richard Dawkins,
treat sex as the central focus of the pair bond,82 a myopia that E.O.
Wilson and other “Harvard School” sociobiologists83 remedy some
what to consider the many social rituals that facilitate and support
pair bonding. But even Wilson leaves a huge part of the story in the
shadows. The primal pair bonding exchange is about more than
just sex. You do not have to be a biologist to know that human
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

HRDY, supra note 62, at 39.
Id. at 1-3.
WILSON, supra note 64, at 158.
DAWKINS, supra note 64, at 161; FISHER, supra note 62, at 99.
HRDY, supra note 62, at 148-51.
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evolution requires reproduction. But traditional sociobiological in
sistence that sex and romance are enough to get your genes to the
next generation undervalues the hours, days, weeks, months, and
years of work it takes to shepherd babies from infancy through
childhood and young adulthood so they, too, can become parents.84
That myopia produces significant distortions by viewing human in
teractions as, at core, kill-or-be-killed contests for survival. Men
battle other men for access to fertile women. Parents ration food
and protection, giving children only enough to ensure that the par
ents’ genes will get to the next generation, and playing favorites if
one child seems more likely than others to survive to adulthood and
continue the reproductive cycle. Dawkins’s version of the battle of
the sexes is even fiercer, with fathers and mothers each trying to
“cheat” each other by skimping on their children, so that each can,
in Dawkins’s words, “have more to spend on other children by
other sexual partners, and so propagate more of his genes.”85
Evolutionary biology evolves, like the organisms it studies,
making room for new research that has corrected significant defects
in Sociobiology 1.0. Wilson sees pair bonding, which includes, but
is not limited to, sex, as the main event.86 That pair bonding, Wil
son reasons, keeps the male around to help out, which increases the
chance of both adults and children surviving, and also of children
growing up and passing on their genes to the next generation.87 But
like many men, Wilson spends much more time talking about
sports, hunting, and other forms of aggression than about the ad
mittedly prosaic food sanitation, meal preparation, and child care
required to ensure a gene’s survival in coming generations. Only
when female researchers like Shelley Taylor and Sarah Blaffer
Hrdy joined the scholarly dialog did the focus expand more fully to
encompass another primal deal, between mothers and other, usu
ally female, caretakers.
B. The Primal Deal among Mothers and Others
Scientists have demonstrated that it takes a village to raise a
child, consistent with the popular saying. Hrdy focuses on our pri
mate ancestors, documenting a primal deal among female
caregivers that, she argues, greatly aided human evolution by al
84. Id. at 46-47.
85. DAWKINS, supra note 64, at 140.
86. WILSON, supra note 64, at 139-40.
87. Id.
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lowing mothers to have children spaced just a few years apart.88
Since our children are dependent on their parents longer than most
other species—unlike foals, say, who stand up minutes after being
born—our survival to adulthood generally requires at least ten
years of daily, hourly, and sometimes even minute-by-minute
care.89 Hrdy acknowledges the power of male-female pair bonds in
evolution, but asserts that the pair-bonding deal accompanied a
deal that, she contends, was even more central to our evolution.
Like Illich and me, she coins a new vocabulary to make this revolu
tionary point. She uses the term “alloparents” to describe the
adults and older children with whom mothers exchange childcare
protection, and food gathering and preparation that give children
the roughly thirteen million calories necessary to bring them to ma
turity.90 These alloparents—literally meaning other-parents—Hrdy
asserts, played an instrumental role in human evolution:
Few animals are born needier or remain dependent longer than
humans. At some point in our distant past, care and provisioning
from alloparents began to permit human mothers to breed at a
faster pace than any ape ever before . . . . Without help from
others, such children could not survive.91

Alloparenting, also known as cooperative breeding, sets humans
apart from most other primates.92
High ape mothers tend to hold their babies continually for the
first year or more until they are weaned, not even allowing the fa
ther to hold them, but human mothers get help from the outset.93
Mothers had to develop extraordinary skills in reading the thoughts
and feelings of others so they could be sure they were entrusting the
baby or child with someone trustworthy. Babies, in turn, evolved to
charm those caretakers with babbling, smiling, and other sociallybonding interactions that only humans and the very few coopera
tively breeding primates exhibit.94 Little by little, in a process that
took some two million years, these crucial skills became part of the
88. SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE 201-02 (1999).
89. Id.
90. HRDY, supra note 62, at 140.
91. Id.
92. Only about 3% of mammals, and 9% of “roughly 10,000 species of birds”
engage in cooperative breeding. Id. at 177.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 122 (noting that only one other primate family, Callitrichidae, pass
through the babbling stage, and they are among the few cooperative breeding
primates).
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human repertoire as the babies who could best charm caretakers to
provide for and protect them survived to adulthood, passing on
those genes and behavioral tricks on to their children.95 Today,
when we coo back and forth with babies we echo these ancient
rituals.
Fathers help out, Hrdy acknowledges.96 But across cultures,
and across time within each culture, paternal contributions are too
highly variable to have, alone, produced our huge population, given
our uniquely expensive, long-dependent offspring. Some of the al
loparent deals only can be done among females, like the common
exchange between lactating mothers in which one breastfeeds the
other’s children if the mother is away for a while, in exchange for
the return favor at another time, or babysitting support.97 Like
many family interactions, alloparenting can take the form of less
literally tit-for-tat exchange, and also pure gift. Often, Hrdy ex
plains, a cycle of seeming gifts look, over time, more like exchanges:
The people you treat generously this year, with the loan of a tool
or gift of food, are the same people you depend on next year
when your waterholes dry up or game in your home range disap
pears . . . . Failures to reciprocate would result in loss of allies or,
worse still, social exclusion.98

Sometimes the exchanges are more immediate. A teenage cousin
helps a mother by babysitting, and, in turn, learns about childcare
so she will know how to provide for a baby when her time comes.
This shared care slowly made us who we are. Back and forth, over
millennia, the ones who engaged in allomothering exchanges were
more likely to survive, and pass their genes and behavioral knowhow to the next generation. “Without alloparents,” Hrdy says
bluntly, “there never would have been a human species.”99
Shelley Taylor similarly argues for natural selection favoring a
tending instinct that, while present in both sexes, is particularly
strong in females. She demonstrates that taking care of others is as
natural and biologically based as eating, sleeping, or sex.100 Taylor
did not set out to study the tending instinct, but stumbled on its
immense impact in her laboratory studies about the effect of stress
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
TIAL

Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 87, 180.
Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 109.
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, THE TENDING INSTINCT: HOW NURTURING
FOR WHO WE ARE AND HOW WE LIVE 10 (2002).
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on health.101 She found that good tending reduces stress and its
emotional, physical, and social toll.102 Bad tending, in turn, like liv
ing with an alcoholic or in a dangerous neighborhood, increases
stress, which in turn increases the incidence and severity of disease,
even shortening life spans. Along the way, Taylor also came up
with a new term. To enrich the “fight or flight” literature, she iden
tified a second response to stress, which she calls “tend and be
friend.”103 Females, she explains, are neurochemically programmed
to respond to stress by first looking around to see if any children
need to be protected (the “tend” part), and then enlisting other
adults to help respond to the danger (“befriend”).104 Tending and
befriending make a huge difference in both everyday life and
emergencies.
Neither Hrdy nor Taylor argues that women and men are des
tined by biology to perform set scripts in which men hunt and wo
men mind the hearth. These full professors could not have
conducted their research at the University of California had they
been chained to the kitchen table. But Hrdy and Taylor do docu
ment, and urge us to value, the huge impact of biological sex
differences.
For example, women’s sex drives and breastfeeding are stimu
lated by an endogenous opiate called oxytocin, which makes people
more trusting, more interested in nuzzling and protecting infants,
and less irritable (all helpful when faced with a squalling infant at
2:00 A.M.).105 Oxytocin also seems to trigger “tend and befriend”
behavior. Taylor explains how estrogen, which women have a lot
of, amplifies the effects of oxytocin.106 While men also have oxyto
cin, and indeed at least one study shows elevated oxytocin levels in
men at orgasm, they are less influenced by oxytocin because testos
terone tamps down its effects.107 These biological differences may
explain part of why women do more tending. Even human fathers,
rock stars though they are compared to other fathers in the animal
101. Id. at 1-3.
102. See generally id. at 52-69 (providing several examples of nurturing that led to
greater emotional, physical, and social health).
103. Id. at 20-22.
104. Id.
105. HELEN E. FISHER, ANATOMY OF LOVE: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MO
NOGAMY, ADULTERY, AND DIVORCE 317 (1992); HRDY, supra note 62, at 169-71.
106. TAYLOR, supra note 100, at 28.
107. HRDY, supra note 62, at 170-71 (noting “couvade,” or reductions of testos
terone in men who live with a pregnant women or care for young children, but that
these changes are much more dramatic in women); TAYLOR, supra note 100, at 28.

424

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:405

kingdom, still do only about 30% of the work it takes to maintain a
household and care for kids, leaving women holding the grocery
bags about 70% of the time.108
The tending deal works in tandem with the pair-bonding deals.
Depending on income, parents either pay child care providers or
rely on help from other mothers, grandmothers, older children,
cousins, sisters, aunts, or others who may be related to the mother
through her pair bond with the child’s father.109 All that care—for
children and whole families —requires scaled-back wage labor.
Men, on average, contribute more cash, and women, on average,
contribute more care, though increasingly women earn more. Over
their prime earning years, American women earn 38% of men’s
wages, and mothers, on average, “earn 67 cents for every dollar
earned by fathers.”110 True, women represent 50% of the Ameri
can workforce, but they work fewer hours for lower wages, so that
they only bring home 28%, on average, of the family income.111
This exchange, money for tending, seems to work well for both men
and women.
Marriage improves health, happiness, and economic stability
more than just about anything else. However, it is especially bene
ficial for men, partly because they benefit so greatly from tending
by their wives. Men who marry, and stay married, have an over
90% chance of living past 65, while women’s life expectancy is not
affected by marriage.112 As Shelley Taylor explains:
Married men typically get many perks that single men and mar
ried women do not usually enjoy. For example, depending on the
marriage, husbands may be fed, clothed, and picked up after, at
least more so than is true for single men or for women. Someone
else very often shops, cooks, cleans the house, does the laundry,
and may even buy their clothes and do their errands.113

Married men also, Taylor explains, “eat more nutritious meals . . .
and are less likely to smoke[,] . . . drink heavily, or abuse illegal
108. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN
CLASS MATTER 23, 82 (2010) (noting that fathers spend one-third to one-half of
the time mothers do on kids’ enrichment activities like piano lessons; fathers, on aver
age, spend one hour with children for every three hours mothers spend). This data is
among American families and may differ in other cultures.
109. HRDY, supra note 62, at 158.
110. WILLIAMS, supra note 108, at 26, 33.
111. Id.
112. TAYLOR, supra note 100, at 114.
113. Id. at 114-15.
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drugs” than single men.114 The primal deals, in short, are good for
both men and women. Men deliver much-needed material support
for women and children, and women, for their part provide extraor
dinarily valuable tending that increases longevity and makes daily
life much easier for everyone in the family. Like any commercial
contract, everyone involved both gives and gets something.
It is important to note that these comparisons of men and wo
men average out in large populations, so that many women are
providers for their family, while many men spend time tending.
One hand-holding study demonstrates the value of tending by hus
bands. University of Virginia psychologist James Coan adminis
tered a mild shock to married women that caused low-level pain.115
The researchers monitored the women’s’ brains using functional
MRI imaging technology to measure how social support might re
duce their experience of stress. Some of the women experienced
the shock alone, others holding a stranger’s hand, and a third group
held their husbands’ hands. The hand holders—both strangers and
husbands—showed lower neural activity in the part of the brain
that regulates stress. But husbands’ hand holding had the biggest
effect, acting on the brain like a pain-reducing drug.116 Good care,
an integral part of the pair bonding exchange, is a good deal. To
gether, the primal deals have the power to protect health, reduce
distress, improve all kinds of relationships, and even lengthen life.
To summarize: evolutionary literature supports some of Illich’s
claims, and refutes others. In particular: it supports his claims that
gender, in many ways, constitutes a deep-seated aspect of our hu
manity that informs daily life and social organization. However,
sociobiological research also undermines Illich’s claim that eco
nomic thinking and exchanges destroyed gender by replacing vi
brant gendered households with sex-neutral economic
partnerships.117 Far from undermining gender, primal exchanges
enabled the formation of gender, and gendered kinship patterns,
among our distant ancestors. Only with the primal deals for pair
bonding and alloparenting could human beings evolve to form Il
lich’s idealized pre-modern societies and our own post-industrial
one. Exchange can hardly be called dehumanizing if it made hu
114. Id. at 115.
115. Tara Parker-Pope, Is Marriage Good for your Health?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Apr. 18, 2010, at 46, 51, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/magazine/18
marriage-t.html?pagewanted=all.
116. Id.
117. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 74, 76, 168.
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manity possible in the first place. Without primal deals there would
be no gender, let alone gender complementarity, or recent press for
the very gender neutrality that Illich abhors.
Family law rules tend to recognize the pair-bonding primal
deal, but largely ignores alloparenting deals. Space constraints pre
clude exploring whether family law should enforce alloparenting
agreements as “contracts,” that create familial right and duties, as
some family law scholars recommend,118 so the discussion here fo
cuses on a select few family law cases to show how contemporary
legal doctrine recognizes both sides of the pair-bonding deal unless
the spouses enter a prenuptial contract that limits property sharing.
Then, courts tend to let the richer spouse out of his side of the deal,
but refuse to allow the poorer, care-taking, spouse to alter her du
ties under the deal. Family law should evolve to more fully value
both feminine and masculine sides of the pair-bonding deal.
Linking Illich’s insights about shadow work with Hrdy’s and
Taylor’s findings about the tending primal deal shows ways that
family law could improve to honor both the feminine and masculine
sides of the primal deals. While current law reflects a good measure
of the “hierarchy and dependence”119 that Illich condemns as prod
ucts of gender neutrality, a fuller recognition of the role of ex
change in family formation and functioning could alleviate a good
bit of that hierarchy and dependence.
III. FAMILY LAW (MOSTLY) HONORS

THE

PRIMAL DEAL

Today, family law mostly honors the pair-bonding primal deal
by treating family property as belonging to both husband and wife
upon divorce, regardless of who made the money used to acquire
that property.120 Here, I discuss one aspect of how family law cur
rently recognizes the pair-bonding deal first by applying a general
rule that treats earnings during a marriage as joint property, and
second, by recognizing an exception to that general rule when modern-day wage-earning spouses contract out of their obligation to
share the contemporary equivalents of rabbits brought home from
the range. Finally, I suggest how family law could extend its recog
nition of the exchanges that lie at the heart of ordinary families by
118. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding
of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 424-27, 443-44 (2008); see also Laura
Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007); Laura A. Rosen
bury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 231 (2007).
119. Id. at 76 (emphasis omitted).
120. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (1973).
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also honoring the value of the feminine tending work done by pri
mary homemakers when spouses enter a prenuptial agreement.
A. Legal Rules Mostly Honor the Primal Deal
The pair-bonding primal deal, in which men work outside the
home more than women, and women work inside the home more
than men, continues to shape many, if not most, ordinary families.
According to Helen Fisher, these patterns are pretty stable across
time and place.121 Studies consistently show that while most people
around the world find good complexions and cleanliness attractive,
“men are attracted to young, good-looking, spunky women, while
women are drawn to men with goods, property, or money,”
whether they are rural Zulus, urban Brazilians, or Americans.122
Along the same lines, a 1997 study by Jean Potuchek reported that
83% of American women in dual-earner couples, and an even
higher percentage of the childrearing women, thought that a man
should be the family’s primary provider.123 Apparently a good
number of people put these beliefs into action, because women, on
average, work fewer hours than men, and earn less than men for the
hours they do work.124 As Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times
columnist Maureen Dowd observes, the increased equality between
men and women has not changed social conventions like women
still expecting men to pay for dinner on a date.125 Indeed, Dowd
suggests that much as she likes men, she’s never married, because
“smart men with demanding jobs would rather have old-fashioned
wives, like their mums, than equals.”126 Case law on marital con
tracting also suggests that Illich has prematurely announced gen
der’s death, and, moreover, that the solution to the inequities
produced by both gender and gender-neutrality may be more, not
less, legal recognition of the exchanges that create and shape family
life.
121. FISHER, supra note 105, at 47.
122. Id.
123. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 27.
124. Id.
125. MAUREEN DOWD, ARE MEN NECESSARY?: WHEN SEXES COLLIDE 37, 47
(2005).
126. Id. This simple pattern holds most true for white Americans. While Afri
can-American women selecting a mate care even more than their white counterparts
about a man’s earning power, African-American men also value their would-be-wives’
economic stability. RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? 46-47
(2011).
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1. Case Stories
The remainder of this Article uses four cases to illustrate the
role of the primal deal in family law. Like all couples, the couples
in these cases doubtless struck lots of informal contracts and deals,
from apartment leases and joint credit cards to deals that one does
the laundry and the other mows the lawn, but the cases got to court
because the couples also made formal agreements to keep their
property separate. The cases, as a group, reveal the background
rule of property sharing that prenuptial contracts can alter, and also
how much the core characteristic of the primal deal—exchange of
food, care, and sex—remains central to family today. In the last
few decades family law has allowed richer spouses—usually, but not
always, husbands—to “contract out” of their duty to provide eco
nomic support, but not, strangely, allowed the poorer spouses—
usually wives—to contract for recognition of their work providing
meals, medical care, household maintenance, and child care. Illich
does not mention prenuptial agreements in Gender, but, if he had,
he likely would have decried courts allowing husbands to contract
out of property sharing as yet another indictment of exchangebased views of family. In contrast, I see exchange as the solution
more than the problem. If family law fully recognized the value of
both sides of the pair-bonding primal deal, it would remunerate
homemakers doing the feminine work of care-giving and foregoing
the masculine work of maximizing their human capital in wage
labor.
My proposal to more fully recognize the exchanges in families
builds on the fact that contracting into a marriage means con
tracting into the pair-bonding primal deal of exchanging economic
support for the emotional, physical, and social support of
“housewifely duties.”127 Family law recognizes this primal deal by
mandating that divorcing couples share property—their house, say,
or a retirement account—that either one acquired during the mar
riage, under the assumption that the person making money and the
one taking care of cooking, cleaning, and caretaking both helped
get those assets. But the contractual nature of relationships re
quires that people be able to change the deal, since contracts, un
like status relationships, are generally modifiable.
Thus, family law since the 1970s has allowed married couples
to “contract out” of the primal deal through prenuptial agreements
127. Kowis v. Kowis, 658 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Mont. 1983) (upholding division of
marital property based on wife’s contribution for “housewifely duties”).
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that provide, basically, “what’s yours is yours and what’s mine is
mine.”128 However, courts have not recognized that the spouses’
contracting out of the primal deal changes the nature of the marital
contract. While the usual marriage deal transforms two people to
an “us,” the contractual refusal to share property transforms that
“us,” back into “me” and “you.” Most people do not enter premar
ital contracts, so most ordinary families remain an “us.” Accord
ingly, most of the time, family law treats valuable things that
spouses give each other as gifts, exchanges of years of financial sup
port, for years of grocery shopping, meal preparation, cleaning, and
child raising. But in the relatively rare cases when the spouses con
tract out of the pair-bonding primal deal, the marriage becomes
foundationally different, no longer as much of a pair bond. Rather
than a two-way contract agreeing to share their wealth, it can be
seen as what contract law calls an illusory promise.129
When a prenuptial agreement demotes the pair-bonding pri
mal deal to an illusory promise, courts should disregard the fiction
of mutual gifts when one side stops giving. Otherwise, the richer
spouse gets a windfall. The increased marketization of family life
that Illich deplores, such as markets for housecleaners, shoppers,
cooks, tutors, babysitters, drivers, and social secretaries, would en
able courts to calculate the value of a homemaker’s contributions to
a wage-earner’s wealth, and award her money in that amount (pos
sibly with interest). That change would both honor spouses’ free
dom to contract—an essential freedom given the importance of
voluntary, mutual exchanges in families and in society more gener
ally—and also value both the feminine and masculine side of that
primal deal.
The very gender neutrality that Illich condemns as bad for wo
men could help them. Men, on average, have higher income and
more wealth, and the contracts allow high wage-earners to shield
that wealth away from the other spouse.130 Consequently, hus
bands are more likely to suggest premarital contracts, and wives are
more likely to resist enforcement of those contracts. In those cases,
family law should recognize the primal deal—both sides of it—that
forms the backdrop of the initial, or background, marital bargain.
128. See e.g., Banks v. Evans, 64 S.W.3d 746 (Ark. 2002); Rider v. Rider, 669
N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 2 cmt. e, 77 cmt. a (1981).
130. Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uni
form Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS 127, 127-28 (1993).
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An 1889 Iowa case clearly articulated the rule treating the fem
inine side of the pair-bonding deal as a gift when it refused to en
force a contract for a Mr. Miller to pay his wife $200 a year to “keep
her home and family in a comfortable and reasonably good condi
tion” in exchange for him providing “the necessary expenses of the
family.”131 Mr. and Mrs. Miller also agreed that “past subjects and
causes of dispute, disagreement and complaint” would be “abso
lutely ignored and buried.”132 Apparently the Millers’ formal, writ
ten agreement was an attempt to stay married after Mr. Miller
spent family finances on another woman. The court refused to en
force Mr. Miller’s promise to pay his wife for her homemaking, rea
soning that her domestic labor was merely, in the court’s words,
what “the law already required her to do.”133 As we will see in
Case #3, Borelli v. Brusseau,134 this seemingly old-fashioned view
remains good law in California today.
If we allow one person in a marriage to contract out of his
obligations, then the old rule should not apply. A court should,
thus, allow the richer spouse to keep his property as contractually
agreed, but also offset that award with money for the homemaking
spouse that reflects her time and effort grocery shopping, cooking,
carpooling to and from school, and cleaning (just for starters). But
before we get to the law as it should be, we must address the law as
it is.
2. Case #1: Barry Bonds Hits a Home Run for Prenuptial
agreements (But His Wife Loses Big Time)
The divorce of baseball superstar Barry Bonds typifies the le
gal rule that allows couples to enter prenuptial agreements.
Granted, Bonds’ money and fame are highly atypical, evidenced by
the fact that the trial judge had to recuse himself because of press
reports that he had requested Barry’s autograph.135 The aspect of
the case, though, that matters for our discussion is its statement of
the general rule that married couples can “contract out” of the pri
131. Miller v. Miller, 42 N.W. 641 (Iowa 1889).
132. Id. at 641.
133. Id. at 642. The detail about Mr. Miller’s wandering appears in an earlier
opinion in the same case, Miller v. Miller, 35 N.W. 464 (Iowa 1887).
134. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
135. Judge Who Heard Barry Bonds’ Child Support Case Has Withdrawn From
the Case, JET, Sept. 26, 1994, at 48.
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mal deal by explicitly saying that the one making the money gets to
keep that money (and houses, cars, furniture, etc. bought with it).136
Historically, couples could not contractually adjust the terms of
their marriage. A century ago, the law did not recognize contracts
made by married women, but now courts assume that women are
competent adults who should be bound by their contracts.137 In the
words of a Pennsylvania case enforcing a prenuptial contract that
limited an unemployed nurse’s share of property and alimony when
she divorced her neurosurgeon husband, “[s]ociety has advanced
. . . to the point where women are no longer regarded as the
‘weaker’ party in marriage, or in society generally,” so that courts
no longer presume “that women are uninformed, uneducated, and
readily subjected to unfair advantage in marital agreements.”138
Like any other contract, however, prenuptial contracts are not en
forceable if they are involuntary (shown by factors like lack of inde
pendent legal advice, too limited time to consider the contract
terms, and duress), it is a one-way deal, or the people’s circum
stances have changed drastically since they entered the
agreement.139
By 2000, Barry Bonds’ personal circumstances had changed
sufficiently that he wanted out of his six-year marriage to Susann
(known as Sun). He had a $43 million, six-year contract to play for
the San Francisco Giants,140 but when Barry and Sun met in Mon
treal in 1987, he was not yet a superstar. Both were twenty-three
years old, and Barry was in his second year of playing for the Pitts
burgh Pirates.141 Neither one could have known that he would play
for twenty-two years, setting records like most Major League Base
ball home runs in a season (73) and over his career (762) and be
136. In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 794-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
137. 1848 N.Y. LAWS 307, ch. 200 (Married Women’s Property Act, used as a
model by other states); NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE (2001).
138. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
139. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 349-54 (N.H. 2003) (prenup
invalid due to disparity in parties’ age, experience, and access to independent advice);
Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 764 N.E.2d 950, 953-54 (N.Y. 2001) (remand to determine if
otherwise valid prenup was unconscionable); Krejci v. Krejci, 667 N.W.2d 780, 788-89
(Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (prenup unenforceable due to failure to provide for appreciation
in value during marriage); UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2) (1983)
(prenups unenforceable if unconscionable due to a party’s lack of knowledge or
disclosure).
140. Murray Chass, Giants Make Investment: $43 Million in Bonds, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1992, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/06/sports/baseball-giants
make-investment-43-million-in-bonds.html.
141. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787.
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named MVP seven times.142 She was newly emigrated from Swe
den, working in a sports bar and harboring ambitions of doing
makeup for the stars.143 Within months, they were living together,
engaged, and planning to fly to Las Vegas for a small wedding.144
The day before the wedding, Barry took Sun to his attorney’s office
on the drive to the airport.145 There they signed an agreement that
would fundamentally change their marriage by contracting out of
Barry’s legal obligations to share property. It read “[w]e agree that
all the earnings and accumulations resulting from the other’s per
sonal services, skill, efforts and work, together with all property ac
quired with funds and income derived therefrom, shall be the
separate property of that spouse.”146 In plain English, as Barry tes
tified at trial, this meant “what’s mine is mine, what’s yours is
yours.”147 At the time, Sun had no property or income, and Barry
took care of all her expenses.148 Her job was being the baseball
player’s wife, providing emotional and social support to him and
later, their two children. Whether or not Sun performed her side of
the primal deal underlying many marriages,149 the court let Barry
evade his half of the primal deal.
The California Supreme Court ruled that Sun voluntarily
signed the agreement.150 Unlike the lower court, the Supreme
Court refused to see Sun as a timid victim bullied into signing the
prenuptial agreement, instead describing her as an “intrepid” wo
man who
emigrated from her homeland at a young age, found employment
and friends in a new country using two languages other than her
native tongue, and in two years moved to yet another country,
142. Barry Bonds Career Stats, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL http://mlb.mlb.com/
team/player.jsp?player_id=111188 (last visited May 24, 2012).
143. Appellant’s Opening Brief, In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (Nos. A075328, A076586), 1997 WL 33562691.
144. Id.
145. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
146. Id. at 817 n.1.
147. Id. at 817.
148. Id. at 788 (noting Barry’s testimony that “Sun didn’t have anything. I paid
for everything) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Ken Hoover, Ex-friend Describes Sun Bonds’ Tantrums, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Dec. 21, 1995, at A-25, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1995/
12/21/MN72411.DTL; Eve Mitchell, Ex-Wife Says Bonds Beat Her Repeatedly During
Marriage, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 7, 1995, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/arti
cle.cgi?f=/e/a/1995/12/07/NEWS7115.dtl.
150. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817 (Cal. 2000).
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expressing the desire to take up a career and declaring to Barry
that she “didn’t want his money.”151

The court does not tell us domestic details like how much time Sun
spent grocery shopping, preparing meals, and caring for their chil
dren and the household. Indeed, given the Bonds’ income, they
may have hired a lot of help, and Sun’s job may have been to spend
time at the gym and spa looking good, and to accompany Barry on
the road.152 But most people running a household do their own
grocery shopping, cooking, and other “housewifely tasks.” Our
next spouses, Claire and Samuel Faiman, were such a couple,
though they were unusual for marrying late in life, and divorcing
even later. Their story shows how family law tends to ignore and
devalue the tremendous contributions of keeping a household fed
and watered (let alone healthy and safe), and also how legal doc
trine could change to value that side of the pair-bonding deal.
3. Case #2: Faiman v. Faiman 153 : Autumn Marriage &
Wintery Divorce
Claire and Samuel Faiman married when she was sixty-one,
and he, ten years older.154 Both were divorced, with children from
their earlier marriages.155 Because Samuel’s home and real estate
business were in Connecticut, Claire had to leave her twenty-five
year job in a Scarsdale, New York synagogue, the house she had
lived in for over three decades, and the community where she had
raised her children.156 While neither Claire nor Samuel was in the
financial major leagues, his net worth (around $2.2 million) was
around ten times hers (around $210,000, most of which was
$150,000 equity in her house).157 Like many couples, their arrange
ment reflected the primal deal, though he was stingier and more
controlling than most providers.
Samuel paid for most household expenses, giving Claire a
weekly shopping allowance of $150-$300, but withholding it when
they went on trips.158 He kept control over the bank accounts, and
151. Id. at 837.
152. See id. at 817.
153. Faiman v. Faiman, No. FA074028181, 2008 WL 5481382 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 5, 2008).
154. Id. at *1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *7.
158. Id. at *2.
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did not make her an owner of their home.159 She paid for her per
sonal expenses out of her modest social security payments.160 De
spite his tightfisted ways, Claire performed her part of the primal
deal, shopping, cooking, and caring for Samuel through illnesses in
cluding a triple bypass surgery, colon cancer, and leukemia that re
quired chemotherapy.161 In addition to changing his bandages and
colostomy bag, she also managed the household and business ac
counts when he could not, though he removed her name from the
accounts as soon as he recovered.162 Even during their divorce trial
she served him breakfast, lunch, and dinner every day.163 Though
Samuel had many faults—the judge described him as “secretive and
controlling,” rude, and even physically abusive, having both pushed
Claire out of bed with his foot and spat in her face—he at least was
honest, testifying at trial that she was a “dutiful wife who kept a
nice home.”164
You cannot help but wonder why she put up with him. She did
consider leaving when, two years into the marriage, he went to visit
an old girlfriend in New Hampshire, leaving a note on the refrigera
tor saying he would be back the next day.165 Claire stayed because,
she explained to the court, she “loved him very much and did not
want a divorce.”166 Though she did not say so on the record, she
also may have stayed because she had given away the Scarsdale
house to her son—losing her only significant asset—and because
Samuel had demanded a prenuptial contract three days before their
wedding.167
Six weeks before the ceremony, Samuel said he wanted a pre
nuptial agreement, and produced a one-page “yellowed” legal
sheet.168 Claire talked to an attorney, and the couple went to the
library to look at prenuptial agreement forms. Samuel wanted to
read them over, and later decided he did not need a prenuptial con
tract. But then, three days before the wedding, he changed his
mind.169 He called Claire in New York, where she was still working
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

*3.
*2.
*1.
*4.

at *3-4.
at *3.
at *5.
at *4.
at *5.
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for the synagogue, and told her she had to come to Connecticut
because they had “some papers to sign.”170 She got the permission
of her rabbi—also her employer—to leave work early, and drove an
hour and a half to his house. He was waiting for her in the drive
way, and drove the two of them to his lawyer’s office. There she
met Samuel’s lawyer and the lawyer he had gotten for her, and saw
the prenuptial agreement for the first time. She was “all shook up,”
she testified, and surprised because she thought the papers would
be about Samuel giving her $100,000 so she would not have
problems with his children after he died.171 Instead, the agreement
said that he would keep all the money and property to himself. The
attorney who met with her for fifteen or thirty minutes testified that
she “seemed surprised at what was being discussed.”172 Even Sa
muel’s attorney said that the whole meeting was “rushed.”173 Sa
muel told her “no agreement, no wedding.”174 Claire did not sign
the agreement right away. Instead, she took it home and signed it
the next day without ever reading it.175
When Claire and Samuel finally did divorce in 2008, they had
been married twenty years.176 She was 81 and he was 91, but still
strong enough to try to fight off her claim to any wealth acquired
during their marriage. The question at trial was whether to enforce
the prenuptial agreement that waived Claire’s right to alimony or
any property held in Samuel’s name.177 That meant nearly all the
property, because he had made sure that just about everything was
his, and his alone. The court ruled in Claire’s favor, and refused to
enforce the premarital agreement.178 Claire received $450,000 in
alimony.179 Alimony is usually paid in installments, but the court
apparently suspected Samuel would resist paying, so it ordered him
to pay her $75,000 immediately, and the rest in installments.
Who gets the money or property matters the most to the peo
ple involved, of course, but for the rest of us, especially lawyers,
judges, and future litigants, the rationale for the ruling is most im
portant. In Faiman v. Faiman, the judge reasoned that Claire re
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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ceived alimony from Samuel because her signature was not fully
voluntary.180 She did not have time to review the agreement, Sa
muel’s lawyer drafted the agreement and picked Claire’s lawyer,
and no one told her what she was giving up. The lawyers did not
explain to her about background legal rules that would entitle her
to share in Samuel’s property, to ask for alimony, and to determine
just how much Samuel had.
The court’s reliance on voluntariness to invalidate the Faimans’
prenuptial contract missed the point. It does not help people in
Claire’s position who do have time to review the prenuptial agree
ment, and independent counsel, and still find they married people
who took everything and gave nothing. The solution need not be a
return to the old rule that did not allow spouses to tailor the terms
of their financial relationship, much as Illich might like to return to
a golden age in which he imagines family relationships were un
tainted by exchange. Instead, courts could take a middle ground
that both honors spouses’ freedom of contract—recognizing that
hyper earners like Barry Bonds should be able to shield some of
their assets—and still keep them from taking undue advantage of
their spouses who contribute, if not half, at least something, to that
high income by keeping the refrigerator stocked, beds made, laun
dry done, and kitchen clean, not to mention kids fed, and reasona
bly clean, healthy, and well-behaved. The current state of the law
creates, in economic lingo that Illich would likely suggest applies to
all economic thought, a moral hazard, allowing richer spouses to
use prenuptial agreements to take unfair advantage of their poorer
spouses. The richer ones like Barry Bonds and Samuel Faiman can
accept, perhaps even demand, their spouses’ time and effort cook
ing, cleaning, raising children, providing nursing care, and maintain
ing a household, without giving anything in return.
Applying this rationale might lead to a different outcome in
cases like Faiman and Bonds. If courts look at what each spouse
did under the pair-bonding deal as well as the terms written into a
premarital agreement, they would get a fuller picture of what
spouses exchanged, and what, therefore, they owe one another
when they divorce. We do not know if Sun Bonds ably managed an
army of paid assistants to cook and clean, looked good herself,
managed the press, and travelled with Barry during baseball season.
She may, instead, have been difficult, drunk, or dirty much of the
time. A trial court could consider these facts, just as it currently
180.

Id. at *9-10.
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examines the voluntariness of a signature based on the time, place,
and duration of a meeting, a person’s ability to hire an independent
lawyer, or whether language barriers or pregnancy hamper free
consent. It need not dissect every moment of daily life. Instead,
just as a court determines where a child will live based on who is the
child’s primary caretaker—looking to who cooks, drives to and
from school, bathes, helps with homework, disciplines, etc.—courts
could consider broad-brush evidence about who shopped, cleaned,
and kept track of when the kids were due for vaccinations and den
tal appointments. Family law could create rebuttable presumptions
that when one spouse works fewer hours, at a lower-paying job, she
is likely doing more of the domestic chores that benefit a whole
household.
B. Improving Family Law by Fully Recognizing Exchange at the
Heart of the Pair-Bonding Primal Deal
Faiman v. Faiman illustrates how family law might recognize a
new defense to enforcing a premarital agreement, which I will call
“breach of the pair-bonding deal.” It could both recognize the ex
change built into the very fabric of ordinary marriage, and give par
ties freedom of contract consistent with the central role of exchange
in families. The defense could include three steps:
Step One: The court could evaluate whether the prenuptial
contract was voluntary and any other arguments that would defeat
enforcement (uncertain terms, for example, or the lack of a signa
ture). If a defense like voluntariness defeats enforcement, the court
need not go further, and would simply apply the background family
law sharing rules. But if no other defenses apply, then the court
could consider whether one party breached the primal deal.
Step Two: The court could compare the marriage to the typical
pair bond deal to determine whether it was breached. Here, the
evidence suggests that Claire held up her end of the pair bond deal,
but Samuel did not. She cared for him, morning, noon, and night,
and barely got a thank-you in return. The prenuptial agreement
formalized that one-sidedness by allowing Samuel to contract out of
his end of the primal deal. Claire, consequently, did not get the
financial sharing that presumably was at least part of the reason she
performed all those housewifely duties.181 Accordingly, their mar
riage was no longer a pair-bond deal, but instead an illusory prom
ise. Courts should disregard the legal fiction that housewifely tasks
181.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS §§ 17, 71 (1981).
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are gifts, because Samuel got everything and Claire got nothing. In
other words, the prenuptial agreement transformed the relationship
from “us” to two individuals. Thus, family law should award Claire
an amount approximating the value of two decades of 24/7 domestic
support.
Step Three: The court could apply contract doctrine or other
areas of law to put a value on the domestic services that a richer
spouse would otherwise get for free. While the prenuptial agree
ment would bar Claire from the full equitable share she would get
under family law, she could still get reimbursed for what Samuel
would have had to pay for round-the clock, seven-days-a-week,
shopping, cooking, cleaning, laundry, and home health care while
he was ill, perhaps under a theory of restitution (preventing his illgotten gain). If he also promised to give her, say, the house when
he died, in exchange for that beyond-the-call-of-duty work empty
ing his colostomy bag herself instead of hiring an aide to do it, then
a court should enforce that promise.
Current family law wrongly devalues these life-enriching, and
even life-saving, tasks by invoking the legal fiction that reciprocal
exchanges under the pair-bonding deal are only gifts. A California
case shows how unfair that fiction can be to spouses who perform
the feminine side of the pair-bonding deal.
1. Case #3: Caring about Care Work: Borelli v. Brusseau
According to a good number of family law scholars, Borelli v.
Brusseau 182 is wrongly decided.183 Viewing the case within the
framework of the pair-bonding primal deal explains why, and also
how family law can correct the mistake in future cases. As the rule
currently stands, Michael Borelli got out of his promise to share his
wealth, but Hildegard Borelli was held to her end of the pair-bond
deal, which required her to personally empty Michael’s bedpans.184
Seventy-something-year-old San Francisco businessman
Michael Borelli married Hildegard Borelli in 1980, when she was
39.185 His finances were closer to Samuel Faiman than to Barry
Bonds, as he owned a successful meat company and other proper
182. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
183. Adrienne Davis, Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 219-20 (2003); Silbaugh, supra note 6, at 32-33; Joan Williams,
Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249, 257-62
(1999).
184. Borelli, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d at 20.
185. Id. at 17.
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ties. The day before their wedding, Michael and Hildegard signed a
premarital agreement that apparently reserved most of his property
(worth around $1.5 million) for his daughter from a prior mar
riage.186 Unlike Sun Bonds and Claire Faiman, Hildegard did not
challenge the validity of this prenuptial contract. Instead, she
sought to enforce an oral agreement they made later to modify it.187
That oral agreement brought their arrangement back toward the
pair-bond deal and California community property rules. Yet the
California courts refused to allow Hildegard to alter her obligation
of emotional and physical care, and enforced only Michael’s con
tracting out of his half of the primal deal.188
Like Samuel Faiman, Michael fell ill within a few years of get
ting married, suffering heart problems and a stroke. By 1988,
Michael’s doctors recommended that he live in a rest home given
his need for round-the-clock nursing care. Understandably, he pre
ferred to live at home, even though it required modifying the house
to account for his limited mobility. Maybe he realized that his re
duced marital obligations under their prenuptial agreement would
justify Hildegard in feeling less obliged under the feminine half of
the pair bond deal. In any case, Michael offered to alter the pre
nuptial contract by changing his will to give Hildegard some of his
property (valued at around $500,000, including money for her
daughter’s education) if she would disregard the doctors’ advice
and provide the nursing care herself, at their home.189
Hildegard performed her part of their deal, personally provid
ing round-the-clock nursing care for Michael until his death the fol
lowing year.190 But Michael did not. While the California courts
have allowed richer spouses like Michael Borelli and Barry Bonds
to contract out of the masculine side of the pair bond deal, they
refused to let Hildegard similarly alter her feminine obligations of
care under the primal deal.
To reach its conclusion, the court had to ignore that Michael
himself had slipped out of his half of the pair-bond deal. Instead,
the court wagged its finger at Hildegard for trying to get something
for doing what marriage itself requires, asserting that “a wife is obli
gated by the marriage contract to provide nursing type care to an ill
186. Wendy L. Hillger, Note, Borelli v. Brusseau: Must a Spouse also be a Nurse?
A Feminist Critique, 25 PAC. L.J. 1387, 1414-16 (1994).
187. Borelli, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d at 20.
188. Id. at 17-18.
189. Id. at 17-18.
190. Id. at 18.
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husband.”191 Echoing the century-old language of the Iowa Su
preme Court quoted above,192 the court in Borelli concluded that a
husband’s agreement to compensate a wife undermines the public
policy of wives caring for husbands.193 Hildegard, as the poorer
spouse, whose contributions came in the form of care, feeding, and
cleaning, had no right to contractually adjust her side of the deal.
The court invoked a sentimental justification for depriving her of
that contractual freedom:
the marital duty of support [under California law] includes caring
for a spouse who is ill . . . . [It] means more than the physical
care someone could be hired to provide. Such support also en
compasses sympathy[,] comfort[,] love, companionship and affec
tion. Thus, the duty of support can no more be “delegated” to a
third party than the statutory duties of fidelity and mutual
respect.194

The court’s contempt for Hildegard’s conduct as “unseemly” and
“sickbed bargaining”195 seems strange in light of Michael’s earlier
bargaining to get out of his support obligations. By concluding that
“even if few things are left that cannot command a price, marital
support remains one of them,”196 the court effectively declared that
spouses cannot contract out of their feminine obligations of tending
support but can contract out of their masculine obligations of finan
cial support. It could only reach this conclusion by willfully ignor
ing the fact that Michael himself had already, at the very outset of
their marriage, contracted out of his own (financial) support obliga
tions to Hildegard. Far from sex neutrality, or gender neutrality,
this outcome applies a double standard to masculine and feminine
duties under the pair bond deal. It is hard to see here how Illich’s
ideal of gender asymmetry protects women, when this genderasymmetrical rule so harmed Hildegard Borelli.
A strong dissenting opinion took the majority opinion in Bo
relli to task for its double standard, highlighting the fact that
Michael already opted out of his own obligations of marital sup
port.197 Pointing out that the majority opinion’s reliance on old,
pre-World War II cases reflected its archaic assumptions about mar
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 19.
Miller v. Miller, 42 N.W. 641, 642 (Iowa 1889).
Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
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riage, Justice Poché asserted that “modern attitudes toward mar
riage have changed,”198 in that many married women work outside
the home, and many husbands do “domestic chores that make a
house a home.”199 Given that California recognizes spouses’ rights
to contract with one another, and the changing roles of men and
women in marriage and society more generally, he reasoned,
spouses’ duties to provide medical care for one another should not
be taken to impose a state-mandated duty to personally provide
that nursing care.200 Writing when Bill Clinton was president, the
dissent warned of grave consequences of not enforcing Michael and
Hildegard’s agreement. To not enforce, it cautioned, meant that “if
Mrs. Clinton becomes ill, President Clinton must drop everything
and personally care for her.”201 Today, in 2012, Hillary Clinton is
the Secretary of State, and the Borelli decision would require her to
drop everything to care for Bill personally if he became ill, jeopard
izing diplomatic relations and other issues of national importance.
That cannot possibly be the right outcome.
Instead, Hildegard should be able to argue that her promise to
care for Michael personally was a contract, supported by considera
tion in the form of Michael promising to contract back into the pair
bond deal by providing for her and her daughter financially when
he died. As long as she can prove the fact of their agreement
(which was apparently oral), and it was voluntary, courts should en
force it. In other words, courts should treat both sides of the pairbond exchange as contractual—legally enforceable—instead of
treating just the masculine side of the exchange as a contractual,
and the feminine side as a mere deal that courts will not honor.
While a change in legal doctrine to treat masculine and femi
nine sides of the pair bond deal the same way would mostly benefit
women, it could also benefit some men, as illustrated by the next
case.
2. Case #4: What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the
Gander
The cases we have discussed, Bonds, Faiman, and Borelli, all
involve richer men and relatively poorer women. But sometimes
the woman is the richer spouse. As Illich rightly observes, gender is
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 24 (Poché, J., dissenting).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24 (Poché, J., dissenting).
Id.
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not tied to people’s genitals, but instead to the work they do within
a system of vernacular gender.202 Accordingly, family law should
treat the feminine side of the pair-bond deal the same whether it is
performed by a man or by a woman. As the following case shows,
both sides of the primal deal—financial support and emotional/do
mestic support—can be done by either men or women, and the only
equality in family law rules here is that courts devalue “feminine”
work done by men as much as they devalue its performance by
women.
Seattle law firm partner Carla DewBerry was the one who
benefitted from her oral prenuptial agreement with Emanuel
George.203 At the time of their agreement, he was a music industry
executive and she was completing her education. Worried that she
might become a financial drain on him, he agreed to marry only if
she agreed to remain employed, not get fat, have a home to return
to if the marriage failed, and treat all property and income as sepa
rate, instead of family, property.204 Carla agreed. Throughout their
fourteen-year marriage, even after the birth of their children, they
never jointly owned a house.205 Carla owned the house, and Em
manuel would pay a set amount each month for living expenses like
utilities. (Emmanuel owned houses in Texas and California that he
had bought before their marriage.) They assiduously maintained
their financial independence, keeping separate bank accounts, and
naming their children, rather than one another, as beneficiaries on
retirement accounts. By the time they separated in 2000, Carla was
a successful lawyer earning more than $1 million a year, and Em
manuel had just switched from driving a UPS truck to training to
become a longshoreman.206 The Washington courts enforced their
contract to keep all property separate, allowing Carla to keep $2.3
million, and leaving Emanuel with $600,000 and salary of less than
$48,000 a year.207 The court justified its ruling by stating the gen
eral rule of enforcing prenuptial agreements: “[t]here is nothing un
fair about two well-educated working professionals agreeing to
preserve the fruits of their labor for their individual benefit.”208
202. ILLICH, supra note 1, 74, 80-81.
203. DewBerry v. George, 62 P.3d 525, 526 (Wash. App. Div. 2003), cert. denied,
77 P.3d 651 (Wash. 2003).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 527.
206. Id. at 527-28.
207. Id. at 527.
208. Id. at 531.
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These cases, Bonds, Faiman, Borelli, and DewBerry, together,
show the intimate exchanges in families. Marriage bound the
spouses, elevating the pair bond deal to a contract that the law en
forces through alimony and property sharing rules. In all four
cases, the spouses chose to contract out of the pair bond deal, but
courts only enforced contracting out of the masculine side of the
deal. Courts indulged in the legal fiction that the feminine side of
the deal is only a gift to mask the value of those housewifely tasks,
effectively ruling that the valuable homemaking work that keeps
families running is actually, according to family law, worthless.
The problem in these cases is not gender neutrality, as Illich
might claim. The injustice is that courts tend to treat only half of
the pair bond obligation as a contract—legally enforceable—and
the other half as a mere deal. The cases also show how right Illich
was in asserting the depth of humanity’s tie to gender. Very few
cases involve rich women like Carla DewBerry keeping property to
themselves. Moreover, the near-ubiquity of spouses exchanging
masculine and feminine work shows how both exchange and gender
lie at the very heart of families. Exchange, in other words, facili
tates gender complementarity in ordinary families, a far cry from
Illich’s claim that exchange is a newcomer to the family scene. A
feminist solution to the problem of courts devaluing the feminine
side of the pair bond deal is to have them honor both sides of the
exchange, not indulge in the fiction that exchanges are not occur
ring at all. Illich mistakenly asserts that symmetry and exchange
demote women to second-class citizenship. Instead, fully recogniz
ing the value of both the feminine and masculine sides of the pair
bond deal could elevate the value of tending work, and thus of wo
men generally, since women are much more likely to perform that
work. To use Illich’s colorful phrase about the usually thankless
work of homemakers, “shadow work,” family law recognition of the
value of that work could bring it out of the shadows, illuminating its
tremendous value to children, men, and women.209
CONCLUSION
Illich, in his zest to valorize pre-capitalist subsistence-level cul
tures, overlooks the exchange that makes all families—pre-capital
209. Tending work often extends beyond the nuclear family. For example, most
of work done caring for elderly relatives is done by women. TED FISHMAN, SHOCK OF
GRAY 96 (2010). Many of those in-family caretakers are daughters in law, nieces,
grandchildren and others outside the immediate nuclear family.
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ist, capitalist, post-industrial capitalist—form and last. Far from
eroding our humanity, exchanges made our humanity possible.
One primal deal is the pair bond between men and women, and
another is the alloparenting bond between mothers and others—
usually other females—who help them care for children. Yet family
law recognizes only part of the pair-bond deal. When a couple mar
ries, they contract into property sharing and tending contracts,
which, to some extent, courts enforce, under the theory that both
people contributed to its acquisition: one through paid labor, and
the other through the care work that keeps a household going.
However, courts also allow richer spouses to contract out of the
masculine side of the deal—by refusing to share property—but do
not allow poorer spouses to adjust their tending obligations under
the pair bond deal.
Modern marriage, therefore, is grounded in a highly gendered
exchange, the very opposite of Illich’s contention that it is a
“genderless economic partnership between a wage laborer and a
shadow worker.”210 Family law falls short by recognizing too little
exchange within families, not too much. It should, in particular, ex
pand its recognition of the pair-bond deal to value the feminine side
of this exchange. If richer spouses, usually men like Barry Bonds
and Michael Borelli, but sometimes women like Carla DewBerry,
contract out of their obligations to remunerate their homemaking
spouses for making “feminine” contributions under the primal deal,
then courts should recognize that those premarital contracts trans
form a marriage from a pair bond, an “us,” to two separate individ
uals. Once courts see the way that prenuptial contracts can destroy
reciprocity, they can award homemaking spouses the value of the
tending work they did, from making children’s lunches to sickbed
care. Family law’s current failure to recognize both sides of the pair
bond exchange penalizes feminine behaviors, the very injustice that
Illich wrote his book to address.

210.

ILLICH, supra note 1, at 168.

